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and logically confused words and
phrases
Scott O. Lilienfeld1*, Katheryn C. Sauvigné2, Steven Jay Lynn3, Robin L. Cautin4,
Robert D. Latzman2 and Irwin D. Waldman1
1 Department of Psychology, Emory University, Atlanta, GA, USA, 2 Department of Psychology, Georgia State University,
Atlanta, GA, USA, 3 Binghamton University – State University of New York, Binghamton, NY, USA, 4 Department of
Psychology, Sacred Heart College, Fairfield, CT, USA
The goal of this article is to promote clear thinking and clear writing among students
and teachers of psychological science by curbing terminological misinformation and
confusion. To this end, we present a provisional list of 50 commonly used terms
in psychology, psychiatry, and allied fields that should be avoided, or at most used
sparingly and with explicit caveats. We provide corrective information for students,
instructors, and researchers regarding these terms, which we organize for expository
purposes into five categories: inaccurate or misleading terms, frequently misused terms,
ambiguous terms, oxymorons, and pleonasms. For each term, we (a) explain why it is
problematic, (b) delineate one or more examples of its misuse, and (c) when pertinent,
offer recommendations for preferable terms. By being more judicious in their use of
terminology, psychologists and psychiatrists can foster clearer thinking in their students
and the field at large regarding mental phenomena.
Keywords: scientific thinking, misconceptions, misunderstandings, terminology, jingle and jangle fallacies
“If names be not correct, language is not in accordance with the truth of things.”
(Confucius, The Analects)
Scientiﬁc thinking necessitates clarity, including clarity in writing (Pinker, 2014). In turn, clarity
hinges on accuracy in the use of specialized terminology. Clarity is especially critical in such
disciplines as psychology and psychiatry, where most phenomena, such as emotions, personality
traits, and mental disorders, are “open concepts.” Open concepts are characterized by fuzzy
boundaries, an indeﬁnitely extendable indicator list, and an unclear inner essence (Pap, 1958;
Meehl, 1986).
Many writers, including students, may take the inherent murkiness of many psychological
and psychiatric constructs as an implicit license for looseness in language. After all, if the core
concepts within a ﬁeld are themselves ambiguous, the reasoning goes, precision in language may
not be essential. In fact, the opposite is true; the inherent openness of many psychological concepts
renders it all the more imperative that we insist on rigor in our writing and thinking to avoid
misunderstandings (Guze, 1970). Researchers, teachers, and students in psychology and allied ﬁelds
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should therefore be as explicit as possible about what are they are
saying and are not saying, as terms in these disciplines readily
lend themselves to confusion and misinterpretation.
For at least two reasons, issues of terminology bear crucial
implications for the education of forthcoming generations of
students in psychology, psychiatry, and related domains. First,
many instructors may inadvertently disseminate misinformation
or foster unclear thinking by using specialized terms in
inaccurate, vague, or idiosyncratic ways. Six decades ago, two
prominent psychiatrists bemoaned the tendency of writers to
use “jargon to blur implausible concepts and to convey the
impression that something real is being disclosed” (Cleckley
and Thigpen, 1955, p. 335). We hope that our article oﬀers a
friendly, albeit greatly belated, corrective in this regard. Second,
if students are allowed, or worse, encouraged, to be imprecise in
their language concerning psychological concepts, their thinking
about these concepts is likely to follow suit. An insistence on
clarity in language forces students to think more deeply and
carefully about psychological phenomena, and serves as a potent
antidote against intellectual laziness, which can substitute for the
meticulous analysis of concepts. The accurate use of terminology
is therefore a prerequisite to clear thinking within psychology and
related disciplines.
Psychology has long struggled with problems of terminology
(Stanovich, 2012). For example, numerous scholars have warned
of the jingle and jangle fallacies, the former being the error
of referring to diﬀerent constructs by the same name and
the latter the error of referring to the same construct by
diﬀerent names (Kelley, 1927; Block, 1995; Markon, 2009). As
an example of the jingle fallacy, many authors use the term
“anxiety” to refer interchangeably to trait anxiety and trait fear.
Nevertheless, research consistently shows that fear and anxiety
are etiologically separable dispositions and that measures of
these constructs are only modestly correlated (Sylvers et al.,
2011). As an example of the jangle fallacy, dozens of studies
in the 1960s focused on the correlates of the ostensibly distinct
personality dimension of repression-sensitization (e.g., Byrne,
1964). Nevertheless, research eventually demonstrated that this
dimension was essentially identical to trait anxiety (Watson and
Clark, 1984). In the ﬁeld of social psychology, Hagger (2014)
similarly referred to the “deja variable” problem, the ahistorical
tendency of researchers to concoct new labels for phenomena that
have long been described using other terminology (e.g., the use of
15 diﬀerent terms to describe the false consensus eﬀect; seeMiller
and Pedersen, 1999).
In this article, we present a provisional list of 50 commonly
used terms in psychology, psychiatry, and allied ﬁelds that should
be avoided, or at most used sparingly and with explicit caveats.
For each term, we (a) explain why it is problematic, (b) delineate
one or more examples of its misuse, and (c) when pertinent,
oﬀer recommendations for preferable terms. These terms span
numerous topical areas within psychology and psychiatry,
including neuroscience, genetics, statistics, and clinical, social,
cognitive, and forensic psychology. Still, in proposing these 50
terms, we make no pretense at comprehensiveness. We are
certain that many readers will have candidates for their own
“least favorite” psychological and psychiatric terms, and we
encourage them to contact us with their nominees. In addition,
we do not include commonly confused terms (e.g., “asocial”
with “antisocial,” “external validity” with “ecological validity,”
“negative reinforcement” with “punishment,” “mass murderer”
with ‘serial killer’), as we intend to present a list of these term pairs
in a forthcoming publication. We also do not address problematic
terms that are restricted primarily to popular (“pop”) psychology,
such as “codependency,” ”dysfunctional,” “toxic,” “inner child,”
and “boundaries,” as our principal focus is on questionable
terminology in the academic literature. Nevertheless, we touch
on a handful of pop psychology terms (e.g., closure, splitting) that
have migrated into at least some academic domains.
Our “eyeball cluster analysis” of these 50 terms has led us
to group them into ﬁve overarching and partly overlapping
categories for expository purposes: inaccurate or misleading
terms, frequently misused terms, ambiguous terms, oxymorons,
and pleonasms. Terms in all ﬁve categories, we contend, have
frequently sown the seeds of confusion in psychology, psychiatry,
and related ﬁelds, and in so doing have potentially impeded (a)
their scientiﬁc progress and (b) clear thinking among students.
First, some psychological terms are inaccurate or misleading.
For example, the term “hard-wired” as applied to human
traits implies that genes rigidly prescribe complex psychological
behaviors (e.g., physical aggression) and traits (e.g., extraversion),
which is almost never the case. Second, some psychological
terms are not incorrect per se, but are frequently misused. For
example, although “splitting” carries a speciﬁc meaning as a
defensive reaction in psychodynamic theory, it is commonly
misused to refer to the propensity of people with borderline
personality disorder (BPD) and related conditions to pit staﬀ
members against each other. Third, some psychological terms are
ambiguous, because they can mean several things. For example,
the term “medical model” can refer to any one (or more) of at
least seven conceptual models of mental illness and its treatment.
Fourth, some psychological terms are oxymorons. An oxymoron
is a term, such as open secret, precise estimate, or ﬁnal draft,
which consists of two conjoined terms that are contradictory.
For example, the term “stepwise hierarchical regression” is an
oxymoron because stepwise and hierarchical multiple regression
are incompatible statistical procedures. Fifth, some psychological
terms are pleonasms. A pleonasm is a term, such as PIN number,
Xerox copy, or advance warning, which consists of two or
more conjoined terms that are redundant. For example, the
term “latent construct” is a pleonasm because all psychological
constructs are hypothetical and therefore unobservable.
Our list of 50 terms, grouped into the ﬁve aforementioned
categories and presented in alphabetical order within each
category, follows.
Inaccurate or Misleading Terms
(1) A gene for. The news media is awash in reports of identifying
“genes for” a myriad of phenotypes, including personality traits,
mental illnesses, homosexuality, and political attitudes (Sapolsky,
1997). For example, in 2010, The Telegraph (2010) trumpeted the
headline, “‘Liberal gene’ discovered by scientists.” Nevertheless,
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because genes code for proteins, there are no “genes for”
phenotypes per se, including behavioral phenotypes (Falk, 2014).
Moreover, genome-wide association studies of major psychiatric
disorders, such as schizophrenia and bipolar disorder, suggest
that there are probably few or no genes of major eﬀect (Kendler,
2005). In this respect, these disorders are unlike single-gene
medical disorders, such as Huntington’s disease or cystic ﬁbrosis.
The same conclusion probably holds for all personality traits (De
Moor et al., 2012).
Not surprisingly, early claims that the monoamine oxidase-
A (MAO-A) gene is a “warrior gene” (McDermott et al., 2009)
have not withstood scrutiny. This polymorphism appears to
be only modestly associated with risk for aggression, and it
has been reported to be associated with conditions that are
not tied to a markedly heightened risk of aggression, such as
major depression, panic disorder, and autism spectrum disorder
(Buckholtz and Meyer-Lindenberg, 2013; Ficks and Waldman,
2014). The evidence for a “God gene,” which supposedly
predisposes people to mystical or spiritual experiences, is
arguably even less impressive (Shermer, 2015) and no more
compelling than that for a “God spot” in the brain (see “God
spot”). Incidentally, the term “gene” should not be confused with
the term “allele”; genes are stretches of DNA that code for a given
morphological or behavioral characteristic, whereas alleles are
diﬀering versions of a speciﬁc polymorphism in a gene (Pashley,
1994).
(2) Antidepressant medication. Medications such as
tricyclics, selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors, and selective
serotonin and norepinephrine reuptake inhibitors, are routinely
called “antidepressants.” Yet there is little evidence that these
medications are more eﬃcacious for treating (or preventing
relapse for) mood disorders than for several other conditions,
such as anxiety-related disorders (e.g., panic disorder, obsessive-
compulsive disorder; Donovan et al., 2010) or bulimia nervosa
(Tortorella et al., 2014). Hence, their speciﬁcity to depression
is doubtful, and their name derives more from historical
precedence—the initial evidence for their eﬃcacy stemmed from
research on depression (France et al., 2007)—than from scientiﬁc
evidence. Moreover, some authors argue that these medications
are considerably less eﬃcacious than commonly claimed, and are
beneﬁcial for only severe, but not mild or moderate, depression,
rendering the label of “antidepressant” potentially misleading
(Antonuccio and Healy, 2012; but see Kramer, 2011, for an
alternative view).
(3) Autism epidemic. Enormous eﬀort has been expended to
uncover the sources of the “autism epidemic” (e.g., King, 2011),
the supposed massive increase in the incidence and prevalence
of autism, now termed autism spectrum disorder, over the past
25 years. The causal factors posited to be implicated in this
“epidemic” have included vaccines, television viewing, dietary
allergies, antibiotics, and viruses.
Nevertheless, there is meager evidence that this purported
epidemic reﬂects a genuine increase in the rates of autism per
se as opposed to an increase in autism diagnoses stemming
from several biases and artifacts, including heightened societal
awareness of the features of autism (“detection bias”), growing
incentives for school districts to report autism diagnoses, and a
lowering of the diagnostic thresholds for autism across successive
editions of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders (Gernsbacher et al., 2005; Lilienfeld and Arkowitz,
2007). Indeed, data indicate when the diagnostic criteria for
autism were held constant, the rates of this disorder remained
essentially constant between 1990 and 2010 (Baxter et al., 2015).
If the rates of autism are increasing, the increase would appear
to be slight at best, hardly justifying the widespread claim of an
“epidemic.”
(4) Brain region X lights up. Many authors in the popular
and academic literatures use such phrases as “brain area X
lit up following manipulation Y” (e.g., Morin, 2011). This
phrase is unfortunate for several reasons. First, the bright red
and orange colors seen on functional brain imaging scans are
superimposed by researchers to reﬂect regions of higher brain
activation. Nevertheless, they may engender a perception of
“illumination” in viewers. Second, the activations represented
by these colors do not reﬂect neural activity per se; they reﬂect
oxygen uptake by neurons and are at best indirect proxies of
brain activity. Even then, this linkage may sometimes be unclear
or perhaps absent (Ekstrom, 2010). Third, in almost all cases,
the activations observed on brain scans are the products of
subtraction of one experimental condition from another. Hence,
they typically do not reﬂect the raw levels of neural activation
in response to an experimental manipulation. For this reason,
referring to a brain region that displays little or no activation
in response to an experimental manipulation as a “dead zone”
(e.g., Lamont, 2008) is similarly misleading. Fourth, depending
on the neurotransmitters released and the brain areas in which
they are released, the regions that are “activated” in a brain scan
may actually be being inhibited rather than excited (Satel and
Lilienfeld, 2013). Hence, from a functional perspective, these
areas may be being “lit down” rather than “lit up.”
(5) Brainwashing. This term, which originated during the
KoreanWar (Hunter, 1951) but which is still invoked uncritically
from time to time in the academic literature (e.g., Ventegodt et al.,
2009; Kluft, 2011), implies that powerful individuals wishing
to persuade others can capitalize on a unique armamentarium
of coercive procedures to change their long-term attitudes.
Nevertheless, the attitude-change techniques used by so-called
“brainwashers” are no diﬀerent than standard persuasive
methods identiﬁed by social psychologists, such as encouraging
commitment to goals, manufacturing source credibility, forging
an illusion of group consensus, and vivid testimonials (Zimbardo,
1997). Furthermore, there are ample reasons to doubt whether
“brainwashing” permanently alters beliefs (Melton, 1999). For
example, during the Korean War, only a small minority of
the 3500 American political prisoners subjected to intense
indoctrination techniques by Chinese captors generated false
confessions. Moreover, an even smaller number (probably under
1%) displayed any signs of adherence to Communist ideologies
following their return to the US, and even these were individuals
who returned to Communist subcultures (Spanos, 1996).
(6) Bystander apathy. The classic work of (e.g., Darley
and Latane, 1968; Latane and Rodin, 1969) underscored the
counterintuitive point that when it comes to emergencies, there
is rarely “safety in numbers.” As this and subsequent research
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 3 August 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 1100
Lilienfeld et al. Psychological terms to avoid
demonstrated, the more people present at an emergency, the
lower the likelihood of receiving help. In early research, this
phenomenon was called “bystander apathy” (Latane and Darley,
1969) a term that endures in many academic articles (e.g., Abbate
et al., 2013). Nevertheless, research demonstrates that most
bystanders are far from apathetic in emergencies (Glassman and
Hadad, 2008). To the contrary, they are typically quite concerned
about the victim, but are psychologically “frozen” by well-
established psychological processes, such as pluralistic ignorance,
diﬀusion of responsibility, and sheer fears of appearing foolish.
(7) Chemical imbalance. Thanks in part to the success of
direct-to-consumer marketing campaigns by drug companies,
the notion that major depression and allied disorders are
caused by a “chemical imbalance” of neurotransmitters, such as
serotonin and norepinephrine, has become a virtual truism in
the eyes of the public (France et al., 2007; Deacon and Baird,
2009). This phrase even crops up in some academic sources; for
example, one author wrote that one overarching framework for
conceptualizing mental illness is a “biophysical model that posits
a chemical imbalance” (Wheeler, 2011, p. 151). Nevertheless,
the evidence for the chemical imbalance model is at best slim
(Lacasse and Leo, 2005; Leo and Lacasse, 2008). One prominent
psychiatrist even dubbed it an urban legend (Pies, 2011). There
is no known “optimal” level of neurotransmitters in the brain, so
it is unclear what would constitute an “imbalance.” Nor is there
evidence for an optimal ratio among diﬀerent neurotransmitter
levels. Moreover, although serotonin reuptake inhibitors, such as
ﬂuoxetine (Prozac) and sertraline (Zoloft), appear to alleviate the
symptoms of severe depression, there is evidence that at least
one serotonin reuptake enhancer, namely tianepine (Stablon),
is also eﬃcacious for depression (Akiki, 2014). The fact that
two eﬃcacious classes of medications exert opposing eﬀects on
serotonin levels raises questions concerning a simplistic chemical
imbalance model.
(8) Family genetic studies. The phrase “family genetic
studies” is commonly used in psychiatry to refer to designs in
which investigators examine the familial aggregation of one or
more disorders, such as panic disorder or major depression,
within intact (i.e., non-adoptive) families (e.g., Weissman, 1993).
Given that the familial aggregation of one or more disorders
within intact families could be due to shared environment rather
than—or in addition to—shared genes (Smoller and Finn, 2003),
the phrase “family genetic study” is misleading. This term implies
erroneously that familial clustering of a disorder is necessarily
more likely to be genetic than environmental. It may also imply
incorrectly (Kendler and Neale, 2009) that studies of intact
families permit investigators to disentangle the eﬀects of shared
genes from shared environment. Twin or adoption studies are
necessary to accomplish this goal.
(9) Genetically determined. Few if any psychological
capacities are genetically “determined”; at most, they are
genetically inﬂuenced. Even schizophrenia, which is among
the most heritable of all mental disorders, appears to have a
heritability of between 70 and 90% as estimated by twin designs
(Mulle, 2012), leaving room for still undetermined environmental
inﬂuences. Moreover, data strongly suggest that schizophrenia
and most other major mental disorders are highly polygenic. In
addition, the heritability of most adult personality traits, such as
neuroticism and extraversion, appears to be between 30 and 60%
(Kandler, 2012). This ﬁnding again points to a potent role for
environmental inﬂuences.
(10) God spot. Seizing on functional imaging ﬁndings that
religious ideation is associated with activations in speciﬁc brain
regions, such as circumscribed areas of the temporal lobe, some
media and academic sources have referred to the discovery of a
“God spot” in the human brain (Connor, 1997). Such language is
scientiﬁcally dubious given that complex psychological capacities,
including religious experiences, are almost surely distributed
across several sprawling networks that themselves encompass
multiple brain regions. Not surprisingly, studies of people
undergoing mystical experiences have reported activation in
many brain areas, including the temporal lobe, caudate, inferior
parietal lobe, and insula (Beauregard and Paquette, 2006; Jarrett,
2014). As one researcher (Mario Beauregard) observed, “There
is no single God spot localized uniquely in the temporal
lobe of the human brain” (Biello, 2007, p. 43). The same
absence of localizational speciﬁcity holds for claims regarding the
identiﬁcation of other purported brain regions, such as an “irony
spot” or “humor spot” (Jarrett, 2014).
(11) Gold standard. In the domains of psychological and
psychiatric assessment, there are precious few, if any, genuine
“gold standards.” Essentially all measures, even those with high
levels of validity for their intended purposes, are necessarily
fallible indicators of their respective constructs (Cronbach and
Meehl, 1955; Faraone and Tsuang, 1994). As a consequence, the
widespread practice referring to even well-validated measures
of personality or psychopathology, such as Hare’s (1991/2003)
Psychopathy Checklist-Revised, as “gold standards” for their
respective constructs (Ermer et al., 2012) is misleading (see
Skeem and Cooke, 2010). If authors intend to refer to measures
as “extensively validated,” they should simply do so.
(12) Hard-wired. The term “hard-wired” has become
enormously popular in press accounts and academic writings in
reference to human psychological capacities that are presumed
by some scholars to be partially innate, such as religion,
cognitive biases, prejudice, or aggression. For example, one
author team reported that males are more sensitive than females
to negative news stories and conjectured that males may be
“hard wired for negative news” (Grabe and Kamhawi, 2006,
p. 346). Nevertheless, growing data on neural plasticity suggest
that, with the possible exception of inborn reﬂexes, remarkably
few psychological capacities in humans are genuinely hard-wired,
that is, inﬂexible in their behavioral expression (Huttenlocher,
2009; Shermer, 2015). Moreover, virtually all psychological
capacities, including emotions and language, are modiﬁable by
environmental experiences (Merzenich, 2013).
(13) Hypnotic trance. The notion that hypnosis is
characterized by a distinct “trance state” remains one of the
enduring myths of popular psychology (Lilienfeld et al., 2009).
In a sample of 276 undergraduates, Green (2003; see also Green
et al., 2006) found that participants gave high ratings (between 5
and 5.5 on 1–7 scale in two experimental conditions) to the item,
“Hypnosis is an altered state of consciousness, quite diﬀerent
from normal waking consciousness” (p. 373). Perhaps not
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surprisingly, the phrase “hypnotic trance” continues to appear in
numerous articles written for the general public (Brody, 2008)
as well as in academic sources (Raz, 2011). Nevertheless, the
evidence that hypnosis is a distinct “trance” state that diﬀers
qualitatively from waking consciousness is scant. There is no
consistent evidence for distinctive physiological (e.g., functional
brain imaging) markers of hypnosis (Lynn et al., 2007). Nor is
there persuasive, or even especially suggestive, evidence that
hypnosis is associated with unique behavioral features. For
example, suggested responses, including hallucinations, amnesia,
and pain reduction, can be achieved in the absence of a “hypnotic
induction” and even when participants report being awake and
alert (Lynn et al., 2015).
(14) Inﬂuence of gender (or social class, education,
ethnicity, depression, extraversion, intelligence, etc.) on X.
“Inﬂuence” and cognate terms, such as eﬀect, are inherently
causal in nature. Hence, they should be used extremely
judiciously in reference to individual diﬀerences, such as
personality traits (e.g., extraversion), or group diﬀerences (e.g.,
gender), which cannot be experimentally manipulated. This
is not to say that individual or group diﬀerences cannot
exert a causal inﬂuence on behavior (Funder, 1991), only that
research designs that examine these diﬀerences are virtually
always (with the rare exception of “experiments of nature,”
in which individual diﬀerences are altered by unusual events)
correlation or quasi-experimental. Hence, researchers should
be explicit that when using such phrases as “the inﬂuence
of gender,” they are almost always proposing a hypothesis
from the data, not drawing a logically justiﬁed conclusion
from them. This inferential limitation notwithstanding, the
phrase “the inﬂuence of gender” alone appears in over 45,000
manuscripts in the Google Scholar database (e.g., Bertakis et al.,
1995).
(15) Lie detector test. Surely one of the most pernicious
misnomers in psychology, the term “lie detector test” is often
used synonymously with the storied polygraph test. This test is
misnamed: it is an arousal detector, not a lie detector (Saxe et al.,
1985). Because it measures non-speciﬁc psychophysiological
arousal rather than the fear of detection per se, it is associated with
high false-positive rates, meaning that it frequently misidentiﬁes
honest individuals as dishonest (Lykken, 1998). In addition, the
polygraph test is susceptible to false-negatives stemming from
the use of physical (e.g., biting the tongue) and mental (e.g.,
performing complex mental arithmetic) countermeasures (Honts
et al., 1994). This evidence notwithstanding, themythical allure of
the polygraph test persists. In one survey, 45% of undergraduates
agreed that this test is an accurate detector of falsehoods (Taylor
and Kowalski, 2010).
(16) Love molecule. Over 6000 websites have dubbed the
hormone oxytocin the “lovemolecule” (e.g., Morse, 2011). Others
have named it the “trust molecule” (Dvorsky, 2012), “cuddle
hormone” (Griﬃths, 2014), or “moral molecule” (Zak, 2013).
Nevertheless, data derived from controlled studies imply that all
of these appellations are woefully simplistic (Wong, 2012; Jarrett,
2015; Shen, 2015). Most evidence suggests that oxytocin renders
individuals more sensitive to social information (Stix, 2014), both
positive and negative. For example, although intranasal oxytocin
seems to increase within-group trust, it may also increase out-
group mistrust (Bethlehem et al., 2014). In addition, among
individuals with high levels of trait aggressiveness, oxytocin
boosts propensities toward intimate partner violence following
provocation (DeWall et al., 2014). Comparable phrases applied
to other neural messengers, such as the term “pleasure molecule”
as a moniker for dopamine, are equally misleading (see Landau
et al., 2008; Kringelbach and Berridge, 2010, for discussions).
(17) Multiple personality disorder. Although the term
“multiple personality disorder” was expunged from the American
Psychiatric Association’s (1994) diagnostic manual over two
decades ago and has since been replaced by “dissociative identity
disorder” (DID), it persists in many academic sources (e.g.,
Hayes, 2014). Nevertheless, even ardent proponents of the view
that DID is a naturally occurring condition that stems largely
from childhood trauma (e.g., Ross, 1994) acknowledge that
“multiple personality disorder” is a misnomer (Lilienfeld and
Lynn, 2015), because individuals with DID do not genuinely
harbor two or more fully developed personalities. Moreover,
laboratory studies of the memories of individuals with DID
demonstrate that the “alter” personalities or personality states of
individuals with DID are not insulated by impenetrable amnestic
barriers (Merckelbach et al., 2002).
(18) Neural signature. One group of authors, after observing
that compliance with social norms was associatedwith activations
in certain brain regions (lateral orbitofrontal cortex and right
dorsolateral cortex), referred to the “neural signature” of social
norm compliance (Spitzer et al., 2007, p. 185). Others have
referred to neural signatures or “brain signatures” of psychiatric
disorders, such as anorexia nervosa (Fladung et al., 2009) and
autism spectrum disorder (Pelphrey and McPartland, 2012).
Nevertheless, identifying a genuine neural signature would
necessitate the discovery of a speciﬁc pattern of brain responses
that possesses nearly perfect sensitivity and speciﬁcity for a
given condition or other phenotype. At the present time,
neuroscientists are not remotely close to pinpointing such a
signature for any psychological disorder or trait (Gillihan and
Parens, 2011).
(19) No diﬀerence between groups. Many researchers, after
reporting a group diﬀerence that does not attain conventional
levels of statistical signiﬁcance, will go on to state that “there
was no diﬀerence between groups.” Similarly, many authors will
report that a non-signiﬁcant correlation between two variables
means that “there was no association between the variables.” But
a failure to reject the null hypothesis does not mean that the
null hypothesis, strictly speaking, has been conﬁrmed. Indeed,
if an investigator ﬁnds a correlation of r = 0.11 in a sample of
20 participants (which is not statistically signiﬁcant), the best
estimate for the true value of the correlation in the population,
presuming that the sample has been randomly ascertained, is
0.11, not 0. Authors are instead advised to write “no signiﬁcant
diﬀerence between groups” or “no signiﬁcant correlation between
variables.”
(20) Objective personality test.Many authors refer to paper-
and-pencil personality instruments that employ a standard
(e.g., True–False) item response format, such as the Minnesota
Multiphasic Personality Inventory-2 (MMPI-2), as “objective
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tests” (Proyer and Häusler, 2007), ostensibly to contrast them
with more “subjective” measures, such as unstructured interviews
or projective techniques (e.g., the Rorschach Inkblot Test).
Nevertheless, although the former measures can be scored
objectively, that is, with little or no error (but see Allard
and Faust, 2000, for evidence of non-trivial error rates in the
hand-scoring of the MMPI and other purported “objective”
personality tests), they often require considerable subjective
judgment on the part of respondents. For example, an item such
as “I have many headaches” can be interpreted in numerous
ways arising from ambiguity in the meanings of “many” and
“headache’ (Meehl, 1945). So-called “objective” personality tests
are also often subjective with respect to interpretation (Rogers,
2003). For example, even diﬀerent computerized MMPI-2
interpretive programs display only moderate levels of inter-rater
agreement regarding proposed diagnoses (Pant et al., 2014). Not
surprisingly, clinicians routinely disagree in their interpretations
of proﬁles on the MMPI-2 and other “objective” tests (Garb,
1998). We therefore recommend that these measures be called
“structured” tests (Kaplan and Saccuzzo, 2012), a term that refers
only to their response format and that carries no implication that
they are interpreted objectively by either examinee or examiner.
(21) Operational deﬁnition. The credo that all psychological
investigators must develop “operational deﬁnitions” of constructs
before conducting studies has become something of a truism
in many psychology methods textbooks and other research
sources (e.g., Burnette, 2007). Operational deﬁnitions are strict
deﬁnitions of concepts in terms of their measurement operations.
As a consequence, they are presumed to be exact and exhaustive
deﬁnitions of these concepts. Perhaps the best known example
in psychology is Boring’s (1923) deﬁnition of intelligence as
whatever intelligence tests measure.
Many psychologists appear unaware that the notion of
operational deﬁnitions was roundly rejected by philosophers
of science decades ago (Leahey, 1980; Green, 1992; Gravetter
and Forzano, 2012). Operational deﬁnitions are unrealistic in
virtually all domains of psychology, because constructs are not
equivalent to their measurement operations (Meehl, 1986). For
example, an “operational deﬁnition” of aggression as the amount
of hot sauce a participant places in an experimental confederate’s
drink is not an operational deﬁnition at all, because no researcher
seriously believes that the amount of hot sauce placed in a drink
is a perfect or precise deﬁnition of aggression that exhausts all
of its potential manifestations. Operational deﬁnitions also fell
out of favor because they led to logically absurd conclusions.
For example, an operational deﬁnition of length would imply
that length as measured by a wooden ruler cannot be compared
with length as measured by a metal ruler, because these rulers
are associated with diﬀerent measurement operations. Hence, the
fact that both rulers yield a length for a table of say, 27 inches,
could not be taken as converging evidence that the table is in fact
27 inches long (Green, 1992).
Psychological researchers and teachers should therefore
almost always steer clear of the term “operational deﬁnition.” The
term “operationalization” is superior, as it avoids the implication
of an ironclad deﬁnition and is largely free of the problematic
logical baggage associated with its sister term.
(22) p = 0.000. Even though this statistical expression,
used in over 97,000 manuscripts according to Google Scholar,
makes regular cameo appearances in our computer printouts, we
should assiduously avoid inserting it in our Results sections. This
expression implies erroneously that there is a zero probability
that the investigators have committed a Type I error, that is, a
false rejection of a true null hypothesis (Streiner, 2007). That
conclusion is logically absurd, because unless one has examined
essentially the entire population, there is always some chance
of a Type I error, no matter how meager. Needless to say, the
expression “p < 0.000” is even worse, as the probability of
committing a Type I error cannot be less than zero. Authors
whose computer printouts yield signiﬁcance levels of p = 0.000
should instead express these levels out to a large number of
decimal places, or at least indicate that the probability level is
below a given value, such as p< 0.01 or p< 0.001.
(23) Psychiatric control group. This phrase and similar
phrases (e.g., “normal control group,” “psychopathological
control group”) connote erroneously that (a) groups of ostensibly
normal individuals or mixed psychiatric patients who are being
compared with (b) groups of individuals with a disorder of
interest (e.g., schizophrenia, major depression) are true “control”
groups. They are not. They are “comparison groups” and should
be referred to accordingly. The phrase “control group” in this
context may leave readers with the unwarranted impression that
the design of the study is experimental when it is actually quasi-
experimental. Just as important, this termmay imply that the only
diﬀerence between the two groups (e.g., a group of patients with
anxiety disorder and a group of ostensibly normal individuals) is
the presence or absence of the disorder of interest. In fact, these
two groups almost surely diﬀer on any number of “nuisance”
variables, such as personality traits, co-occurring disorders, and
family background, rendering the interpretation of most group
diﬀerences open to multiple interpretations (Meehl, 1969).
(24) Reliable and valid. If one earned a dollar for every time
an author used the sentence “This test is reliable and valid”
in a Method section, one would be a rich person indeed, as
the phrase “reliable and valid” appears in more than 190,000
manuscripts in Google Scholar. There are at least three problems
with this ubiquitous phrase. First, it implies that a psychological
test is either valid or not valid. Much like the testing of scientiﬁc
theories, the construct validation process is never complete, in
essence reﬂecting a “work in progress.” As a consequence, a
test cannot be said to be have been conclusively validated or
invalidated (Cronbach and Meehl, 1955; Loevinger, 1957; Peter,
1981). Hence, authors should similarly refrain from using the
term “validated’ with respect to psychological measures. At best,
these measures are “empirically supported” or have “accrued
substantial evidence for construct validity.” The same caveat
applies to psychological treatments.WhenDivision 12 (Society of
Clinical Psychology) of the American Psychological Association
put forth its criteria for, and lists of, psychotherapies found to
work in controlled trials for speciﬁc mental disorders, it initially
termed them “empirically validated therapies” (Chambless et al.,
1998). Nevertheless, in recognition of the fact that “validation”
implies certainty or ﬁnality (Garﬁeld, 1996; Chambless and
Hollon, 1998), the committee wisely changed the name to
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“empirically supported therapies,” which is now the term
presently in use (Lilienfeld et al., 2013).
Second, the phrase “reliable and valid” implies that reliability
and validity are unitary concepts. They are not. There are three
major forms of reliability: test–retest, internal consistency, and
inter-rater. Contrary to common belief, these forms of reliability
often diverge, sometimes markedly (Schmidt and Hunter, 1996).
For example, scores derived from the Thematic Apperception
Test, a widely used projective technique, frequently display
high levels of test–retest reliability but low levels of internal
consistency (Entwistle, 1972). There are also multiple forms
of validity (e.g., content, criterion-related, incremental), which
similarly do not necessarily coincide. For example, a measure
may possess high levels of criterion-related validity in multiple
samples but little or no incremental validity above and beyond
extant information (Garb, 2003).
Third, reliability and validity are conditional on the speciﬁc
samples examined, and should not be considered inherent
properties of a test. Hence, the notion that a test is “reliable
and valid” independent of the nature of the sample runs
counter to contemporary thinking in psychometrics (American
Psychological Association and American Educational Research
Association, 2014).
(25) Statistically reliable. This phrase appears in over
62,000 manuscripts according to Google Scholar. It is typically
invoked when referring to statistical signiﬁcance, e.g., “Although
small in absolute terms, this diﬀerence was statistically reliable,
t(157) = 2.86, p = 0.005” (Zurbriggen et al., 2011, p. 453).
Nevertheless, despite what many psychologists believe (Tversky
and Kahneman, 1971; Krueger, 2001), statistical signiﬁcance
bears at best a modest conceptual and empirical association with
a result’s “reliability,” that is, its replicability or consistency over
time (Carver, 1978). Indeed, given the low statistical power of
most studies in psychology, a reasonable argument could be
advanced that most statistically signiﬁcant results are unlikely to
be reliable. The statistical signiﬁcance of a result should therefore
not be confused with its likelihood of replication (Miller, 2009).
(26) Steep learning curve. Scores of authors use the phrase
“steep learning curve” or “sharp learning curve” in reference to a
skill that is diﬃcult to master. For example, when referring to the
diﬃculty of learning a complex surgical procedure (endoscopic
pituitary surgery), one author team contended that it “requires a
steep learning curve” (Koc et al., 2006, p. 299). Nevertheless, from
the standpoint of learning theory, these and other authors have it
backward, because a steep learning curve, i.e., a curve with a large
positive slope, is associated with a skill that is acquired easily and
rapidly (Hopper et al., 2007).
(27) The scientiﬁc method. Many science textbooks,
including those in psychology, present science as a monolithic
“method.” Most often, they describe this method as a
hypothetical-deductive recipe, in which scientists begin with
an overarching theory, deduce hypotheses (predictions) from
that theory, test these hypotheses, and examine the ﬁt between
data and theory. If the data are inconsistent with the theory, the
theory is modiﬁed or abandoned. It’s a nice story, but it rarely
works this way (McComas, 1996). Although science sometimes
operates by straightforward deduction, serendipity and inductive
observations oﬀered in the service of the “context of discovery”
also play crucial roles in science. For this reason, the eminent
philosopher of science Popper (1983) quipped that, “As a rule,
I begin my lectures on Scientiﬁc Method by telling my students
that the scientiﬁc method does not exist. . .” (p. 5).
Contrary to what most scientists themselves appear to believe,
science is not a method; it is an approach to knowledge
(Stanovich, 2012). Speciﬁcally, it is an approach that strives
to better approximate the state of nature by reducing errors
in inferences. Alternatively, one can conceptualize science as a
toolbox of ﬁnely honed tools designed to minimize mistakes,
especially conﬁrmation bias – the ubiquitous propensity to
seek out and selectively interpret evidence consistent with our
hypotheses and to deny, dismiss, and distort evidence that
does not (Tavris and Aronson, 2007; Lilienfeld, 2010). Not
surprisingly, the speciﬁc research methods used by psychologists
bear scant surface resemblance to those used by chemists,
astrophysicists, or molecular biologists. Nevertheless, all of these
methods share an overarching commitment to reducing errors in
inference and thereby arriving at a more accurate understanding
of reality.
(28) Truth serum. “Truth serum” is a supposed substance
that, when administered intravenously, leads individuals to
disclose accurate information that they have withheld. Most so-
called truth serums are actually barbiturates, such as sodium
amytal or sodium pentothal (Keller, 2005). Even today, some
prominent psychiatrists still refer to these substances as truth
serums (e.g., Lieberman, 2015), and they are still frequently
administered for legal purposes in certain countries, such as India
(Pathak and Srivastava, 2011). Nevertheless, there is no evidence
that so-called truth serums reveal veridical information regarding
past events, such as childhood sexual abuse (Bimmerle, 1993).
To the contrary, like other suggestive memory procedures, they
are associated with a heightened risk of false memories and false
confessions (Macdonald, 1955), probably because they lower the
response threshold for reporting all information, accurate and
inaccurate alike. Furthermore, individuals can and do readily lie
under the inﬂuence of truth serum (Piper, 1993).
(29) Underlying biological dysfunction. In this era of the
increasing biologization of psychology and psychiatry (Miller,
2010; Satel and Lilienfeld, 2013), authors may be tempted to
assume that biological variables, such as parameters of brain
functioning, “underlie” psychological phenomena. For example,
one set of authors wrote that “cognitive impairments are
central to schizophrenia and may mark underlying biological
dysfunction” (Bilder et al., 2011, p. 426). Nevertheless,
conceptualizing biological functioning as inherently more
“fundamental” than (that is, causally prior to) psychological
functioning, such as cognitive and emotional functioning, is
misleading (Miller, 1996). The relation between biological
variables and other variables is virtually always bidirectional.
For example, although the magnitude of the P300 event-related
potential tends to be diminished among individuals with
antisocial personality disorder (ASPD) compared with other
individuals (Costa et al., 2000), this ﬁnding does not necessarily
mean that the P300 deﬁcit precedes, let alone plays a causal
role in, ASPD. It is at least equally plausible that the personality
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dispositions associated with ASPD, such as inattention, low
motivation, and poor impulse control, contribute to smaller P300
magnitudes (Lilienfeld, 2014). The same inferential limitation
applies to many similar phrases, such as “biological bases of
behavior,” “brain substrates of mental disorder,” and “neural
underpinnings of personality” (Miller, 1996).
Frequently Misused Terms
(30) Acting out. Numerous articles use this term as a synonym
for any kind of externalizing or antisocial behavior, including
delinquency (e.g., Weinberger and Gomes, 1995). In fact, the
term “acting out” carries a speciﬁc psychoanalytic meaning that
refers to the behavioral enactment of unconscious drives that are
ostensibly forbidden by the superego (Fenichel, 1945). Hence,
this term should not be used interchangeably with disruptive
behavior of all kinds and attributable to all causes.
(31) Closure. The term “closure” was introduced by Gestalt
psychologists (Koﬀka, 1922) to refer to the tendency to
perceive incomplete ﬁgures as wholes. This term has since been
misappropriated by popular psychologists (Howard, 2011) and
social scientists of various stripes (e.g., Skitka et al., 2004)
to describe the purported experience of emotional resolution
experienced by victims of trauma following an event of symbolic
importance. For example, many advocates of the “closure
movement” contend that the execution of a murderer assists the
loved ones of victims to put an end to their grieving process.
Nevertheless, this use of the term “closure” is hopelessly vague,
as it is rarely if ever clear when trauma victims have achieved the
desired emotional end-state (Radford, 2003; Weinstein, 2011).
Nor is there research support for the proposition that many or
most victims experience this end-state after events of symbolic
signiﬁcance, such as executions or funerals (Berns, 2011).
(32) Denial. Denial, a psychodynamic defense mechanism
popularized by Freud (1937), is an ostensibly unconscious refusal
to acknowledge obvious facts of reality, such as the death
of a loved one in an automobile accident (Vaillant, 1977).
Nevertheless, thanks largely to the popular psychology industry,
this term has been widely misappropriated to refer to the
tendency of individuals with a psychological condition, such as
alcohol use disorder (formerly called alcoholism), to minimize
the extent of their pathology (e.g., Wing, 1995).
(33) Fetish. A fetish, formally referred to as “Fetishistic
Disorder” in the current version of the Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5; American Psychiatric
Association, 2013, p. 700), is a psychiatric condition marked by
persistent, intense, and psychologically impairing sexual arousal
derived from inanimate objects (e.g., shoes) or non-genital body
parts (e.g., legs). This term, which is technically a paraphilia,
should not be used to refer to generic preferences for speciﬁc
objects, ideas, or people. One writer, for example, described
the national fascination of the Japanese with smartphones as a
“feature phone fetish” (Smith, 2015).
(34) Splitting. “Splitting” similarly refers to a psychodynamic
defense mechanism, ostensibly ubiquitous in BPD, that forces
individuals to see people as all good or all bad rather than
in shades of gray, warts and all (Muller, 1992). By engaging
in splitting, people with BPD and similar conditions are
hypothesized to avoid the anxiety of perceiving those they love
as the hopelessly ﬂawed creatures that they are. Nevertheless,
this term is consistently misused to refer to the propensity of
people with BPD to “pit” staﬀ members on a psychiatric unit (or
other caregivers) against one another. This disruptive behavior,
sometimes termed “staﬀ splitting” (Linehan, 1989), should not be
confused with the formal meaning of splitting.
Ambiguous Terms
(35) Comorbidity. This term, which has become ubiquitous
in publications on the relations between two or more mental
disorders (appearing in approximately 444,000 citations in
Google Scholar), refers to the overlap between two diagnoses,
such as major depression and generalized anxiety disorder.
A similar term, “dual diagnosis,” which has acquired considerable
currency in the substance abuse literature in particular, refers
to the simultaneous presence of a mental disorder, such as
schizophrenia, and a substance abuse disorder, such as alcoholism
(Dixon, 1999). Some authors have taken the comorbidity concept
further, extending it to “trimorbidity” (Cornelius et al., 2001) or
“quatromorbidity” (Newman et al., 1998).
Nevertheless, “comorbidity” can mean two quite diﬀerent
things. It can refer to either the (a) covariation (or correlation)
between two diagnoses within a sample or the population or
(b) co-occurrence between two diagnoses within an individual
(Lilienfeld et al., 1994; Krueger and Markon, 2006). The ﬁrst
meaning refers to the extent to which Condition A and B are
statistically associated across individuals; for example, there is
substantial covariation between ASPD and BPD (Becker et al.,
2014). The second meaning is a conditional probability referring
to the proportion of individuals with Condition A who meet
diagnostic criteria for Condition B. For example, in the case of
the latter meaning, researchers might note that 45% of patients
with ASPD also meet diagnostic criteria for BPD. The diﬀerence
between these two meanings is hardly trivial, because they tend
to be diﬀerentially inﬂuenced by base rates (prevalences). If the
base rates of one or more conditions change, the covariation
between them will not necessarily be aﬀected but the level of
co-occurrence almost always will be (Lilienfeld et al., 1994).
Moreover, depending on the base rates of the diagnoses in
a sample, two conditions may display little or no covariation
but substantial co-occurrence. For example, although ASPD
and major depression typically display only modest covariation
(Goodwin and Hamilton, 2003), the rates of co-occurrence
between ASPD and major depression in an analysis conditioned
on major depression (that is, the rates of ASPD among people
with major depression) would be extremely high in a prison
sample, because most prison inmates meet criteria for ASPD
(Flint-Stevens, 1993). Hence, the levels of comorbidity would
probably be negligible in the ﬁrst case but high in the second. If
authors elect to use the term “comorbidity,” they should therefore
be explicit about which meaning (covariation or co-occurrence)
they intend.
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Some authors (Lilienfeld et al., 1994) have further questioned
the routine use of the term comorbidity in psychopathology
research given that this term, much like “dual diagnosis,”
presupposes that the conditions in question are etiologically and
pathologically separable entities (but see Rutter, 1994; Spitzer,
1994, for demurrals). For example, although the high level of
“comorbidity” between ASPD and BPD may reﬂect covariation
or co-occurrence between two distinct conditions, it may instead
reﬂect the fact that the current diagnostic system is attaching
diﬀerent names to slightly diﬀerent manifestations of a shared
diathesis, thereby falling prey to a jangle fallacy. To take an
admittedly extreme example, how likely is it that a participant
in a published study who simultaneously met diagnostic criteria
for all 10 DSM personality disorders (see Lilienfeld et al., 2013)
genuinely possessed 10 distinct disorders at the same time?
Critics of the expansive application of the term comorbidity
to descriptive psychopathology contend that these diagnostic
conundrums are best explained by a ﬂawed diagnostic system that
is attaching diﬀerent names to highly overlapping constructs.
(36) Interaction. As Olweus (1977) observed in the context
of the person-situation debate, the term “interaction” has
multiple meanings, some of them logically incompatible. For
example, the familiar phrase “genes and environment interact
for Disorder X” can mean any one of four things: (a) genes and
environment are both involved in the causes of Disorder X; (b)
the relation between genes and environments are bidirectional,
because genes inﬂuence the environments to which people
are exposed (by means of gene-environment correlations), and
environments inﬂuence which genes are activated or inactivated
(by means of epigenetic processes); (c) the inﬂuences of genes and
environment are inseparable because of continuous transaction
within individuals; or (d) the statistical eﬀects of genes depend on
people’s environments, and the statistical eﬀects of environments
depend on people’s genes. Only meaning (d) refers to a statistical
interaction in the standard multiple regression or analysis of
variance sense.
Two points are worth noting here. First, psychologists
routinely confuse meanings (a) and (d). For example, when
researchers write that “All reasonable scholars today agree that
genes and environment interact to determine complex cognitive
outcomes” (Bates et al., 1998, p. 195), some readers may assume
that they are referring to the standard statistical meaning of
the term “interaction,” (McClelland and Judd, 1993), i.e., a
multiplicative rather than additive relation between variables,
such as that between genetic and environmental inﬂuences.
Instead, in this case the authors appear to be saying only
that both genes and environment play a role in cognitive
outcomes, a scenario that does not require a multiplicative
relation between genes and environment. Second, meanings (c)
and (d) are logically incompatible, because if the eﬀects of genes
and environment are not separable, then clearly they cannot
be distinguished in statistical designs. The bottom line: when
authors use the term “interaction,” they should be explicit about
which of the four meanings they intend.
(37) Medical model. Although many authors who invoke
the term “medical model” presume that it refers to a single
conceptualization (e.g., Mann and Himelein, 2008), it does not.
Some authors insist that the term is so vague and unhelpful
that we are better oﬀ without it (Meehl, 1995). Among other
things, it has been wielded by various authors to mean (a)
the assumption of a categorical rather than dimensional model
of psychopathology; (b) an emphasis on underlying “disease”
processes rather than on presenting signs and symptoms; (c) an
emphasis on the biological etiology of psychopathology; (d) an
emphasis on pathology rather than on health; (e) the assumption
that mental disorders are better treated by medications and other
somatic therapies than by psychotherapy; (f) the assumption
that mental disorders are better treated by physicians than by
psychologists; or (g) the belief that mentally ill individuals who
engage in irresponsible behavior are not fully responsible for
such behavior (see Blaney, 1975, 2015, for discussions). Similar
semantic and conceptual ambiguities bedevil the term “disease
model” when applied to addictions and most other psychological
conditions (e.g., Graham, 2013).
(38) Reductionism. There may be no greater insult in
psychological circles than to brand a colleague a “reductionist.”
Indeed, merely accusing a fellow faculty member of “being
reductionistic” is often an eﬀective conversation-stopper at
cocktail parties. The negative connotation attached to this term
neglects the point, overlooked by many authors (e.g., Harris,
2015), that “reductionism” is not one approach. Robinson
(1995) delineated multiple forms of reductionism, including (a)
nominalistic reduction, i.e., reduction at the level of names
(“A brain structure called the amygdala plays a key role in
fear processing”); (b) nomological reduction, i.e., reduction at
the level of scientiﬁc explanation (“The perception of edges is
mediated in part by feature detection cells in the visual cortex”);
and (c) ontological reduction, i.e., reduction by eliminating
immaterial entities (“Neuroscientiﬁc data strongly suggest that
there is no immaterial soul”).
More broadly, we can diﬀerentiate between two quite
diﬀerent brands of reductionism: constitutive and eliminative,
the latter termed “greedy reductionism” by Dennett (1995). The
constitutive reductionist believes merely that everything that
is “mental” is ultimately material at some level, and that the
“mind” is what the brain and rest of the central nervous system
do. Constitutive reductionists (like nomological reductionists;
Robinson, 1995), who appear to comprise an overwhelming
majority of psychologists and neuroscientists, reject mind-body
dualism, the claim that the mind is entirely separable from the
brain. In contrast, eliminative reductionists go a large step further
(Lilienfeld, 2007). They contend that the “mind” will eventually
be explained away entirely by lower-level concepts derived from
neuroscience, and that mentalist concepts, such as thoughts,
motives, and emotions, will ultimately be rendered superﬂuous
by neuroscientiﬁc explanations. For eliminative reductionists,
the ﬁeld of psychology will eventually be “gobbled up” by
neuroscience. Although we do not attempt to adjudicate the
dispute between constitutive and eliminative reductionists here,
suﬃce it to say that “reductionism” does not carry a single
meaning in psychology. As a result, psychologists who use
“reductionist” as a handy term of opprobrium against their
colleagues must be explicit about which form of reductionism
they are invoking.
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Oxymorons
(39)Hierarchical stepwise regression. Hierarchical and stepwise
multiple regression are entirely separate – and incompatible
- procedures. Still, they are readily confused, because in
hierarchical regression, variables are entered in sequential steps.
Speciﬁcally, in hierarchical multiple regression the investigator
speciﬁes an a priori order of entry of the variables, ideally on
theoretical grounds. In contrast, in stepwise multiple regression,
the investigators allows the computer to select the order of entry
of the variables (and the ﬁnal variables in the equation) on
empirical grounds, namely, by choosing each successive predictor
based on the highest incremental contribution to variability in the
outcome variable (Wampold and Freund, 1987; Petrocelli, 2003).
Many authors have wisely warned against the routine use of
stepwise regression procedures on the grounds that they typically
capitalize heavily on chance ﬂuctuations in datasets and rarely
yield replicable results (Thompson, 1989).
(40) Mind-body therapies. The term “mind-body therapy”
(e.g., Naliboﬀ et al., 2008) refers to a panoply of treatments,
such as relaxation, meditation, Reiki, yoga, and biofeedback,
that purportedly harness mental functioning to enhance physical
health (Wolsko et al., 2004). This term implies erroneously that
the “mind” is materially separate from the “body” and thereby
endorses a simplistic version of mind-body dualism. Rather than
conceptualizing such interventions as making use of the mind to
inﬂuence the body, we should conceptualize them as making use
of one part of the body to inﬂuence another.
(41)Observable symptom. This term, which appears in nearly
700 manuscripts according toGoogle Scholar, conﬂates signs with
symptoms. Signs are observable features of a disorder; symptoms
are unobservable features of a disorder that can only be reported
by patients (Lilienfeld et al., 2013; Kraft and Keeley, 2015).
Symptoms are by deﬁnition unobservable.
(42) Personality type. Although typologies have a lengthy
history in personality psychology harkening back to the writings
of the Roman physician Galen and later, Swiss psychiatrist
Carl Jung, the assertion that personality traits fall into distinct
categories (e.g., introvert vs. extravert) has received minimal
scientiﬁc support. Taxometric studies consistently suggest that
normal-range personality traits, such as extraversion and
impulsivity, are underpinned by dimensions rather than taxa,
that is, categories in nature (Haslam et al., 2012). With the
possible exception of schizotypal personality disorder (but see
Ahmed et al., 2013), the same conclusion holds for personality
disorders (Haslam et al., 2012). Hence, if authors elect to use the
phrase “personality type,” they should qualify it by noting that the
evidence for a genuine typology (i.e., a qualitative diﬀerence from
normality) is in almost all cases negligible within the personality
domain.
(43) Prevalence of trait X. Authors in the psychological and
psychiatric literatures frequently refer to “the prevalence” or
“base rate” of attributes that are dimensionally distributed in
the population, such as personality traits and intelligence. For
example, one author team referred to the “greater prevalence
of extraversion in American students” (p. 1153) compared with
Korean students (Song and Kwon, 2012). Nevertheless, such
terms as “prevalence,” “incidence,” “base rate,” “false positive,” and
“false negative” are premised on a taxonic model: they presume
that the phenomena in question are inherently categorical,
that is, either present or absent in nature. For psychological
features that are continuously distributed, such terms should be
avoided. In the aforementioned phrase, referring to “higher levels
of extraversion in American students” would have been more
accurate.
(44) Principal components factor analysis. According to
Google Scholar, this phrase appears in thousands of articles,
including one co-authored by the ﬁrst author of this manuscript
(Reynolds et al., 1988). Nevertheless, this phrase is incoherent,
because principal components analysis (which is commonly
misspelled as “principle components analysis”) and factor
analysis are incompatible approaches to data analysis. Principal
components analysis is a data reduction technique that relies
on the total variance of the variables in a dataset; its principal
goal is to create a smaller set of weighted variables (variates)
that approximate the variance of the original variables (Weiss,
1970). In contrast, factor analysis relies only on the shared
variance of the variables in a dataset, and it is designed to
identify underlying dimensions that best explain the covariation
among these variables (Bryant and Yarnold, 1995). In contrast to
principal components analysis, whose primary aim is to simplify
a dataset by yielding fewer observed variables, the primary
aim of exploratory factor analysis is to identify dimensions
that ostensibly account for the covariation among the observed
variables.
(45) Scientiﬁc proof. The concepts of “proof” and
“conﬁrmation” are incompatible with science, which by its
very nature is provisional and self-correcting (McComas, 1996).
Hence, it is understandable why Popper (1959) preferred the
term “corroboration” to “conﬁrmation,” as all theories can in
principle be overturned by new evidence. Nor is the evidence
for scientiﬁc theories dichotomous; theories virtually always
vary in their degree of corroboration. As a consequence, no
theory in science, including psychological science, should
be regarded as strictly proven. Proofs should be conﬁned to
the pages of mathematics textbooks and journals (Kanazawa,
2008).
Pleonasms
(46) Biological and environmental inﬂuences. This phrase
implies that biological inﬂuences are necessarily genetic,
and cannot be environmental. Nevertheless, “environmental
inﬂuences” encompass everything external to the organism that
aﬀects its behavior following its fertilization as a zygote. As a
consequence, the environment comprises not only psychosocial
inﬂuences, but also non-genetic biological inﬂuences, such as
nutrition, viruses, and exposure to lead and other toxins (e.g.,
Nisbett et al., 2012). The phrase “biological and environmental
inﬂuences” is therefore a partial pleonasm.
(47) Empirical data. “Empirical” means based on
observation or experience. As a consequence, with the
possible exception of information derived from archival
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sources, all psychological data are empirical (what would “non-
empirical” psychological data look like?). Some of the confusion
probably stems from the erroneous equation of “empirical” with
“experimental” or “quantitative.” Data derived from informal
observations, such as non-quantiﬁed impressions collected
during a psychotherapy session, are also empirical. If writers wish
to distinguish numerical data from other sources of data, they
should simply call them “quantiﬁed data.”
(48) Latent construct. A “construct” in psychology is a
hypothesized attribute of individuals that cannot be directly
observed, such as general intelligence, extraversion, or
schizophrenia (Cronbach and Meehl, 1955; Messick, 1987).
Therefore, all constructs are latent. The same terminological
consideration applies to the phrase “hypothetical construct.”
Authors would be better advised to instead use “construct” or
“latent variable.”
(49) Mental telepathy. Telepathy, one of the three ostensible
types of extrasensory perception (along with clairvoyance
and precognition), is the purported ability to read other’s
minds by means of psychic powers (Hyman, 1995). Hence, all
telepathy is necessarily mental. The term “mental telepathy,”
which appears to be in common currency in the academic
literature (e.g., Lüthi, 2013; Sagi-Schwartz et al., 2014),
implies erroneously that there are “non-mental” forms of
telepathy.
(50) Neurocognition. Many authors have invoked the
term “neurocognition” to refer to cognition, especially
when conceptualized within a biological framework (e.g.,
Mesholam-Gately et al., 2009). Nevertheless, because all
cognition is necessarily neural at some level of analysis, the
simpler term “cognition” will do. In fairness, “neurocognition”
is merely one among dozens of terms preceded by
the preﬁx “neuro” that have recently become popular,
including neuroeducation, neuroaesthetics, neuropolitics,
neuropsychoanalysis, and neurosexology (Satel and Lilienfeld,
2013). In the words of one psychologist, “Unable to persuade
others about your viewpoint? Take a Neuro-Preﬁx – inﬂuence
grows or your money back” (Laws, 2012).
Concluding Thoughts
We modestly hope that our admittedly selective list of 50 terms
to avoid will become recommended, if not required, reading for
students, instructors, and researchers in psychology, psychiatry,
and similar disciplines. Although jargon has a crucial place
in these ﬁelds, it must be used with care, as the imprecise
use of terminology can engender conceptual confusion. At
the very least, we hope that our article encourages further
discussion regarding the vital importance of clear writing and
clear thinking in science, and underscores the point that clarity
in writing and thinking are intimately linked. Clear writing
fosters clear thinking, and confused writing fosters confused
thinking. In the words of author McCullough (2002), “Writing
is thinking. To write well is to think clearly. That’s why it’s so
hard.”
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